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Abstract
Most work in mechanism design assumes that buyers are risk neutral; some considers risk
aversion arising due to a non-linear utility for money. Yet behavioral studies have established
that real agents exhibit risk attitudes which cannot be captured by any expected utility model.
We initiate the study of revenue-optimal mechanisms under buyer behavioral models beyond
expected utility theory. We adopt a model from prospect theory which arose to explain these
discrepancies and incorporates agents under-weighting uncertain outcomes. In our model, an
event occurring with probability x < 1 is worth strictly less to the agent than x times the value
of the event when it occurs with certainty.
In contrast to the risk-neutral setting, the optimal mechanism may be randomized and
appears challenging to find, even for a single buyer and a single item for sale. Nevertheless, we
give a characterization of the optimal mechanism which enables positive approximation results.
In particular, we show that under a reasonable bounded-risk-aversion assumption, posted pricing
obtains a constant approximation. Notably, this result is risk-robust in that it does not depend
on the details of the buyer’s risk attitude. Finally, we examine a dynamic setting in which the
buyer is uncertain about his future value. In contrast to positive results for a risk-neutral buyer,
we show that the buyer’s risk aversion may prevent the seller from approximating the optimal
revenue in a risk-robust manner.
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1 Introduction
Most work in mechanism design is based on the assumptions that agents have quasilinear utilities
and are expected utility maximizers. Owing to its linearity, this model of behavior is mathemat-
ically simple and allows for a number of beautiful characterizations of optimal and near-optimal
mechanisms. The few exceptions to this line of work employ von Neumann and Morgenstern [19]’s
expected utility theory (EUT): assuming that agents are expected utility maximizers, although
they may have a non-linear utility for money.1 Reality, however, is more complex. Numerous
experiments, including the famous Allais paradox [1],2 have uncovered behavior that cannot be
captured by EUT.
Among the work in behavioral game theory that attempts to fit a mathematical model onto
observed attitudes, the most accepted non-EUT theory is Kahneman and Tversky [10]’s Prospect
Theory (PT) and its extensions. Prospect theory hypothesizes that risk attitudes arise not only
from a non-linear utility for money but also from agents’ perception of random outcomes. For
example, the risk attitude of a buyer who prefers $50 with certainty over $100 with probability
1/2 can be explained in two ways: as in EUT, the buyer may value $100 at less than twice $50;
alternately, the buyer may value obtaining $100 with probability 1/2 at less than half his value for
$100. Thus, aversion to uncertainty3 provides an alternate explanation for this example, with or
without a concave utility for money.
A basic premise of PT is that agents fundamentally misvalue random events. On the other
hand, much of optimal mechanism design relies on the use of randomness, both in exploiting the
agent’s uncertainty about the environment and other agents’ types, as well as in offering randomized
outcomes or lotteries. As such, it is imperative to understand whether the main insights and results
of mechanism design continue or fail to hold under risk attitudes described by prospect theory.
In this paper we revisit some basic mechanism design questions for risk-averse agents who
undervalue random outcomes. While PT has been studied extensively within behavioral economics,
to our knowledge ours is the first work to consider its implications for mechanism design.4 We
consider the setting of selling one or two items to a single buyer, with the goal of maximizing the
seller’s revenue.
1In particular, if the monetary value of the outcome of a process is (random variable) v, then the agent derives
a utility u(v), where u is some non-linear function, and aims to maximize E[u(v)]. In the risk-neutral case, u is the
identity function.
2Subjects are asked to choose between two options: option A rewards $1M with certainty; option B rewards $1M
with probability 89%, increases the reward to $5M with probability 10%, but rewards nothing with the remaining 1%
probability. Most people prefer the certain reward to the small-probability risk of getting nothing, even though the
latter is counterbalanced by the possiblity of a much larger reward. Subjects are then asked to choose between two
other options that are modifications of the first two: option C has a reward of $1M with 11% probability and nothing
otherwise; option D rewards $5M with probability 10%, or nothing with the remaining 90% probability. Each of C
and D are obtained from options A and B by reducing the probability of receiving the $1M reward by a fixed amount
and replacing it with no reward. The paradox is that in the second case, most people choose option D over option C.
No assignment of utilities to the two amounts can explain this “switch” in preferences across the two experiments.
This paradox can be explained through prospect theory, including the special case that we study.
3In this paper, the term “uncertainty” refers to chance or randomness rather than Knightian uncertainty. We
sometimes use the term “uncertainty aversion” to distinguish prospect-theoretic risk attitudes from EUT-style risk
attitudes. Elsewhere in the paper, however, risk will refer to PT-style risk.
4See a complete discussion of related work at the end of this section.
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A basic model for aversion to risk.
In general, prospect theory incorporates both an agent’s non-linear utility for value and a non-linear
attitude toward probability. The buyer’s net utility from a random value is then the weighted (non-
linearly over outcomes) expectation of the non-linear utility function applied to the value. We aim
to isolate the effect of this non-linear weighting of probability on mechanism design, and therefore
consider a simpler special case in which the utility function is linear but the buyer maximizes
weighted expected utility.
In our model, if the agent is offered a gain of u with probability x, his utility from this random
outcome is given by u×y(x). The weighting function y maps probabilities to weighted probabilities,
y : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], with y(0) = 0 and y(1) = 1. It encodes how strongly the agent dislikes randomness.
If y is convex, the agent displays risk-averse behavior—the less likely an event is, the more the agent
discounts his value. On the other hand, concavity captures risk-seeking behavior. We focus on risk
aversion and assume throughout the paper that the weighting function is convex.
More generally, we define the notion of weighted expectation, a.k.a. risk-averse expectation,
of a random variable taking on many different values.5 Our definition has a clean mathematical
formulation in terms of the random variable’s distribution. For example, just as the expectation
of a non-negative random variable with c.d.f. F can be written as an integral over 1 − F (x), the
weighted expectation is an integral over y(1 − F (x)). This definition follows from requiring that
certain events do not affect the agent’s evaluation of random events. In particular, for a constant c
and random variable X, the weighted expectation of c+X is just c plus the weighted expectation
of X. The useful implication for mechanism design is that the agent’s wealth does not affect his
preferences within the mechanism.
Single-shot mechanism design.
We begin our investigation with the simplest mechanism design setting, namely a monopolist selling
a single item to a single buyer. When the buyer is risk-neutral, it is well known that the revenue-
optimal mechanism is a deterministic mechanism, namely a posted price. Relative to a risk-neutral
buyer, a risk-averse buyer reacts to a deterministic posted price the same way, but undervalues
mechanisms that employ randomness. Therefore one might expect that the optimal single-item
mechanism for a risk-averse buyer continues to be a posted price. This turns out to not be the case
— by offering lotteries alongside certain outcomes, the mechanism can exploit the buyer’s aversion
to risk to extract more revenue for the sure outcomes. As risk-aversion grows, the seller can extract
nearly all of the buyer’s value.6
What do optimal mechanisms look like? We think of mechanisms as menus where each option
corresponds to a (correlated) random allocation and random payment. We show that revenue-
optimal menus are composed of binary or two-outcome lotteries, where each lottery sells the item
at a certain price with some probability.7 In particular, it doesn’t help the mechanism to offer
5In the context of a multi-stage mechanism or protocol, we define the agent’s utility as the risk averse expectation
of the random variable that represents the agent’s net earnings at the end of the process. Importantly, risk averse
expectation is not linear, and so does not separate neatly into contributions from each step in the process.
6Similar results are also known to arise from extreme aversion to risk within EUT, as in the work of Matthews
[14], for example.
7Note that in our model, in contrast to the risk-neutral setting, charging a price upfront for a randomized allocation
and charging a price only when the item is allocated are not equivalent. The former is generally worse than the latter
in terms of the revenue it generates.
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menu options with multiple random outcomes. Given this format, we can express the payment as
a function of the allocation rule in the form of a payment identity. Unfortunately, this payment
identity is not linear in the allocation rule, and so does not permit a closed form solution for the
optimal mechanism.
Risk robustness.
The theory of optimal mechanism design is often criticized for being too detail-oriented, and conse-
quently impractical. Designing optimal mechanisms in the settings we consider is even less practical
and realistic in this regard—the seller needs to know not only the buyer’s value distribution but
also his weighting function exactly. Indeed it is difficult to imagine that a buyer can describe his
own weighting function in any manner other than reacting to options presented to him. We there-
fore consider the problem of designing mechanisms that achieve revenue guarantees robust to the
precise risk model.
Formally, given a family of weighting functions, we ask for a single mechanism that for every
weighting function in the family is approximately optimal with respect to the revenue-optimal
mechanism specific to that weighting function. While it appears challenging to obtain a constant-
factor risk-robust approximation8 for arbitrary families of weighting functions, we obtain a simple
approximation under a boundedness condition on the buyer’s risk attitude. Specifically, we show
that such a result is possible under a certain boundedness condition on the buyer’s risk attitude.
As long as there is some probability x = 1 − Θ(1) at which the buyer’s weight is y(x) = Θ(1),
then Myerson’s optimal posted pricing mechanism achieves an O(1) approximation to the optimal
revenue. In other words, the only “bad” case for revenue maximization, where the optimal revenue
is far greater than that achievable from a risk neutral buyer, is when the buyer values any event
with probability bounded away from 1 at a weight arbitrarily close to 0.
The implication for market design is that deterministic mechanisms continue to perform well
as long as the buyer’s aversion to risk is bounded.
Dynamic mechanism design.
We next consider a sequential sale of two items to the buyer. Consider the following two-stage
mechanism design problem. The seller has one item to sell in each stage. During the first stage, the
buyer knows his value for the first item, but not for the second item. At this time, the seller may
charge the buyer a higher or lower price for the first item in exchange for a second-stage mechanism
that is more or less favorable, respectively, to the buyer. In the second stage, the buyer’s value for
the second item is realized. The seller follows through with his commitment and sells the second
item according to the mechanism promised in the first stage. Several recent works have studied
these kinds of dynamic mechanism design settings with risk-neutral buyers.
The setting we consider is a special case of that introduced by Papadimitriou et al. [16] and
subsequently studied by Ashlagi, Daskalakis, and Haghpanah [2] and Mirrokni et al. [15]. Ashlagi,
Daskalakis, and Haghpanah show that in the optimal mechanism the seller generally charges higher
prices in the first stage in exchange for a higher expected utility promised to the buyer in the second
stage. In fact in some cases it becomes possible to extract the smaller of the buyer’s expected values
8In Section 3.4 we give an O(log logH) risk-robust approximation under certain assumptions, where H is the ratio
of the maximum to the minimum value in the buyer’s value distribution.
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for the two items9. Ashlagi, Daskalakis, and Haghpanah’s mechanisms have an unusual format,
however. The mechanisms offer a menu to the buyer in which the buyer’s net utility from every
menu option is zero (even accounting for future gains). Since the buyer is now indifferent between
all of the menu options, he by default picks the most expensive one he can afford. Observe that
the revenue guarantee of this mechanism is quite fragile with respect to the buyer’s risk attitude.
Since different menu options have different amounts of risk involved, if the buyer’s risk attitude
changes, the options are no longer all equivalent and the mechanism loses significant revenue. Is a
risk-robust approximation achievable in the dynamic setting?
We first show that the kinds of mechanisms and revenue guarantees that Ashlagi, Daskalakis,
and Haghpanah obtain in the risk-neutral setting continue to hold in risk-averse settings, when
the seller knows the buyer’s weighting function. We focus on the simple class of posted pricing
mechanisms where each menu option offers the buyer a fixed price in each stage, but the second-
stage price is a decreasing function of the first-stage price. Beyond the single-shot revenues in both
stages, posted price mechanisms can obtain an additional revenue of O(E[min(v1,Ey[v2])]), where
Ey[v2] is the risk-averse or weighted expectation of v2, but not much more.
We then explore whether it is possible to extract a constant fraction of E[min(v1,Ey[v2])] via
posted price mechanisms in a risk-robust manner. We construct a family of value distributions and a
family of weighting functions such that the buyer’s risk-averse expectation of his second-stage value
exhibits a large range under different weighting functions, although all of the weighting functions
satisfy the boundedness condition discussed previously. We then show that for any constant α > 1,
there exists a value distribution in the family such that no posted pricing mechanism can obtain an
α risk-robust approximation to revenue with respect to all of the weighting functions we consider.
The moral of these results is that, in order to for a seller to increase her revenue by exploiting the
buyer’s lack of information and the inherent risk in future outcomes, she needs precise information
about the buyer’s attitude towards risk, without which such revenue extraction is not possible.
A summary of our results.
Our main results can be summarized as follows.
• Optimal mechanisms in the single-shot setting are menus of binary lotteries. See Theorem 1.
• In the single-shot setting, optimal mechanisms can obtain much more revenue than Myerson’s
mechanism; however, under a natural condition bounding the extent of risk-aversion, Myerson’s
mechanism extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. See Theorems 2 and 4.
• For the dynamic two-stage setting, we present an upper bound as well as a 2-approximation to
the revenue achievable using posted-price mechanisms. See Theorems 5 and 6.
• We exhibit an example that shows that it is impossible to obtain any constant factor risk-robust
approximation to revenue in the two-stage setting, even if the buyer’s risk aversion is bounded.
See Theorem 7.
9To be precise, if the buyer’s values are denoted v1 and v2 respectively, these mechanisms can extract
E[min(v1,E[v2])] plus the single-shot revenues in the two stages.
5
Related work.
Although empirically successful, prospect theory as defined by Kahneman and Tversky [10] suffers
from a number of weaknesses, rectified in a series of works subsumed by the cumulative prospect
theory10 of Tversky and Kahneman [18]. Our model is readily seen to be a special case of Kothiyal,
Spinu, and Wakker [11]’s extension of cumulative prospect theory to continuous values.11 See [12]
for a survey of non-EUT theories.
Despite the success of prospect theory, expected utility theory remains the standard in mecha-
nism design, where a large body of work studies revenue-optimal mechanism design. For example,
Hu, Matthews, and Zou [9] compare different auction formats. More relevant, Matthews [14] and
Maskin and Riley [13] characterize the optimal mechanism under certain expected-utility models;
our Theorems 1 and 2 (characterization of the optimal mechanism and full welfare extraction un-
der extreme risk aversion, respectively) have close analogues in their work. Unsurprisingly, these
characterizations are complex and work in limited settings.
Non-EUT models have thus far attracted less attention in the mechanism design community.
Fiat and Papadimitriou [7] study existence and computation of equilibria in a variety of models,
including special cases of prospect theory. Easley and Ghosh [6] explore the implications of a
realistic, prospect-theoretic behavioral model in contract design. Azevedo and Gottlieb [3] look at
designing gambles for buyers with prospect-theoretic attitudes, but this is not relevant in problems
where buyers have a type that must be elicited. To our knowledge, we are the first to consider
revenue maximization within any non-EUT model.
Much recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has explored revenue guarantees that are ro-
bust to finer details of the model. To our knowledge, however, only three works consider robustness
to the buyer’s risk attitude. Dughmi and Peres [5] show that truthful-in-expectation mechanisms
can be implemented almost as-is in a manner robust to risk attitudes. Fu, Hartline, and Hoy [8] and
Chawla et al. [4] provide risk-robust revenue guarantees in (different) stylized settings; Fu, Hart-
line, and Hoy’s mechanism is additionally independent of the buyers’ value distributions. Their
techniques are unrelated to ours.12
2 A Model for Risk Aversion
A major premise of prospect theory, inherited from the rank-dependent expected utility of [17], is
that the agent fundamentally misvalues random events. While prospect theory allows for both risk-
averse and risk-seeking attitudes, we consider only risk-averse buyers. Thus, if the agent gains value
v with probability x, his risk-averse utility from this random event is y(x)v where y(x) ≤ x. The
function y is called a probability weighting function. Prospect theory requires that the weighting
function satisfy the following properties: (1) y : [0, 1] → [0, 1], and (2) y(0) = 0 and y(1) = 1.
Because we are interested in risk-averse behavior, we additionally assume (3) y is weakly increasing
and convex.
10In modern usage, “prospect theory” is understood to mean this improved theory and its extensions.
11Other than assuming that the utility u is the identity function, we also assume that the probability weighting
function for losses is related to the probability weighting function for gains in a manner that satisfies the additivity
axiom. See Section 2. In general, PT allows these to be different functions.
12Chawla et al. [4]’s guarantees work for any risk model where the utility drawn from a random outcome is no more
than the expected value of the outcome. The other works consider EUT models of risk.
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Given such a weighting function y, we next describe how to compute the risk-averse expectation,
Ey, of a random variable V that denotes the random value that an agent gains. Suppose, for
example, that an agent gains a value of $1 with probability 1/2 and $2 with probability 1/2. Then
we observe that the agent gets a value of $1 with probability 1, and an increment of $1 with
probability 1/2. So, the risk-averse expectation of his value, a.k.a. his risk-averse utility, ought
to be ($1) + ($1) × y(1/2), because he faces no risk over the first $1. Our definition is therefore
designed to satisfy the following additivity axiom:
For any constant c, Ey[c+ V ] = c+Ey[V ] .
The additivity axiom implies, in particular, that the utility of an agent from participating in a
mechanism does not depend on the wealth of the agent, but rather only depends on how much
the agent gains or loses in the mechanism. Accordingly, we express the risk-averse expectation in
the form of increments from a base value. Formally, the risk-averse expectation of a non-negative
random variable is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let Z be a random variable supported over [0,∞) with c.d.f. F . Then the risk-averse
expectation of the random variable with respect to weighting function y is
Ey[Z] =
∫ ∞
0
y(1− F (z))dz.
To understand this definition, observe that for any z, dz is the difference between z− dz and z,
and this difference is earned with probability 1−F (z). Compare this against the standard definition
of expectation:
E[Z] =
∫ ∞
0
z dF (z) =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (z))dz.
The weighting function for losses.
When the random variable Z takes on negative values, we need to take extra care in defining its
risk-averse expectation. Once again, following the additivity axiom stated above, for L = inf{z :
F (z) > 0}, we define
Ey[Z] = L+Ey[Z − L]
= L+
∫ ∞
0
y(1− F (z + L))dz
= L+
∫ ∞
L
y(1− F (z))dz.
It is convenient to express the contributions of the negative values that Z takes to the risk-averse
expectation in the form of decrements from the base value of 0. Accordingly, we obtain the following
equivalent definition:
Definition 2. Let Z be a random variable supported over (−∞,∞) with c.d.f. F . Then the
risk-averse expectation of the random variable with respect to weighting function y is
Ey[Z] = −
∫ 0
−∞
(1− y(1− F (z)))dz +
∫ ∞
0
y(1− F (z))dz. (1)
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See Figure 1 for an illustration of this definition. As an aside, it is well known that the quantile of
a draw from a distribution is itself distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. We note that integrating
(1) by parts shows our model can be interpreted as sampling the distribution by drawing a quantile
according to the distribution with probability mass function y′. We skip the details.
0
z
0
1
F
(z
)
0
z
0
1
1
−
y
(1
−
F
(z
))
Figure 1: The transformation of a c.d.f. F (z) by a weighting function y as described in Definition 2.
Left: The expected value of a random variable Z drawn from F is equal to the difference between
the shaded areas: the area above the curve on the positive axis adds to the expectation, and the
area below the curve on the negative axis subtracts. Right: The risk-averse expectation is defined
to be the expectation of the transformed curve. After transformation by y, the positive area has
decreased while the negative area has increased. The risk-averse expectation is therefore less than
the true expectation. The original c.d.f. is shown as a dotted line for comparison.
Some examples.
Example 1. If y(x) = x for all x ∈ [0, 1], then the risk-averse expectation is exactly the expectation
of the distribution. I.e., the agent is risk-neutral.
Example 2. If the distribution of Z is a point mass at z, its risk-averse expectation is exactly z.
Example 3. Suppose that Z takes on the value v with probability 1/2 and −v with probability
1/2, then its risk averse expectation is −v + (2v)y(1/2) = −v(1 − 2y(1/2)). Since we assume
y(1/2) ≤ 1/2, this quantity is non-positive.
More generally, if the distribution of Z is symmetric around 0, that is, for all z > 0, F (−z) =
1− F (z), then E[Z] = 0. The risk-averse expectation, on the other hand, is non-positive:∫ ∞
0
(y(1− F (z)) + y(1− F (−z)) − 1)dz =
∫ ∞
0
(y(1 − F (z)) + y(F (z)) − 1)dz
≤
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (z) + F (z)− 1)dz = 0.
Quantifying risk aversion.
The buyer’s risk attitude in our model is described by a function rather than by one (or a few)
parameters. While this leads to a rich set of behaviors, it makes it challenging to understand, for
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example, whether one weighting function is more risk-averse than another. We argue that a natural
measure for the extent of risk aversion is the gap between the function and the x and y axes. In
other words, if the function “hugs” the axes x = 0 and y = 1, then the buyer heavily discounts
all events that happen with probability bounded away from 1, and is highly risk-averse. On the
other hand, if the function is bounded away from the axes, then the buyer is less risk-averse. See
Figure 2.
0 1
x
0
1
y
(x
)
β
Figure 2: A β-bounded weighting function: the area of the shaded rectangle is β, which is the
maximal area of any rectangle contained under the curve. This area gives a measure of the aversion
to risk: a smaller β corresponds to stronger aversion to risk.
Definition 3. A weighting function is β-bounded if there exists an x ∈ (0, 1) such that y(x)(1−x) ≥
β. In other words, y is β-bounded if we can fit a rectangle with area β under the curve.
We will see in Section 3.4 that β-boundedness affects the revenue approximation achievable for
the given weighting function.
3 Single-Shot Revenue Maximization
We begin by considering the “single-shot” setting in which the seller wants to sell a single item to
the buyer. The buyer’s value v for the item is drawn from a known distribution F . When the buyer
is risk-neutral, it is well known that the optimal mechanism is deterministic, and in particular
is a posted-price mechanism. Observe that a risk-averse buyer obtains the same utility from a
posted-price as a risk-neutral one, so over the class of posted-price mechanisms, the optimal one
remains the same regardless of the buyer’s risk attitude. We will refer to the optimal posted price
as the Myerson price, and to the corresponding mechanism as Myerson’s mechanism. We denote
the revenue obtained by Myerson’s mechanism as
Mye(F ) = max
p
{p(1− F (p))}.
Given that a risk-averse buyer derives less utility from a randomized outcome than a risk-neutral
buyer does, one might conclude that the optimal mechanism for a risk-averse buyer continues to
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be deterministic. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case, as our next example shows. The seller
exploits the buyer’s risk aversion to price higher allocations superlinearly.
Example 4. Suppose v ∼ U [0, 1] and y(x) = x2. The optimal deterministic mechanism offers a
price of 1/2 and earns revenue of 1/4 in expectation.
Suppose we offer an additional option: the binary lottery (1/2, 3/8) allocates the item to the
buyer with probability 1/2 and if the item is allocated, charges the price 3/8.
The buyer chooses the deterministic option if (v − 1/2) ≥ (v − 3/8)(1/2)2 ; that is, if v ≥ 1324 .
Otherwise, he chooses the second option as long as v ≥ 3/8. The expected revenue is therefore
1
2
(
1−
13
24
)
(1) +
3
8
(
13
24
−
3
8
)(
1
2
)
=
25
96
> 1/4.
3.1 Incentive Compatible Mechanisms.
Any single-shot mechanism can be described by the allocation it makes and the prices it charges to
the buyer as a function of the buyer’s value. Let X(v) and P (v) denote these functions, with X(v) ∈
{0, 1} and P (v) ∈ R≥0. Observe that X(v) and P (v) are random variables and may be correlated.
Then, the buyer’s risk-averse utility from the mechanism’s outcome is given by Ey[vX(v) − P (v)].
We say that a mechanism with allocation and pricing functions (X,P ) is incentive compatible (IC)
for a buyer with weighting function y if for all possible values v, v′ of the buyer, it holds that
Ey[vX(v) − P (v)] ≥ Ey
[
vX(v′)− P (v′)
]
.
It is without loss of generality to express an incentive compatible mechanism in the form of a
menu, M, with each menu option, a.k.a. lottery, corresponding to a particular correlated random
(allocation, payment) pair, (X,P ). Then, the allocation and payment of a buyer with value v and
weighting function y is given by the utility-maximizing menu option:13
(Xy(v), Py(v)) = argmax(X,P )∈MEy[vX − P ] .
The revenue of the mechanism is therefore given by
Revy,F (M) = Ev∼F [E[Py(v)]] ,
where F denotes the distribution from which v is drawn.
Let OPT(y, F ) denote the optimal revenue achievable by an incentive compatible mechanism
from selling an item to a buyer with weighting function y and value drawn from F :
OPT(y, F ) = max
M
Revy,F (M).
We will drop y from the above definitions when it is clear from the context.
13We assume that any ties are broken in favor of menu options with a higher expected price.
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Utility functions and binary lotteries.
Lotteries in a mechanism may have many different outcomes—they may charge a random price
when the item is not allocated, and a different random price when the item is allocated. When a
buyer purchases such a lottery, his risk-averse utility as a function of his value depends on which
of the outcomes of the lottery bring him negative utility and which ones bring positive utility.
Example 5. Consider a lottery with three outcomes and a buyer with weighting function y(x) = x2.
With probability 1/2, X = P = 0; with probability 1/4, X = 1 and P = 1; with probability 1/4,
X = 1 and P = 2. The risk-averse utility of this lottery is plotted on the left in Figure 3. At worst,
a buyer pays 2 and has v = 0, hence the buyer has a base value of −2 and measures increments
from there. A buyer with value v ∈ [0, 1) gets a negative utility from both of the second and third
outcomes. His risk-averse utility is
−2 + (v)y(1) + (1)y(3/4) + (1− v)y(1/2) =
3
4
v −
19
16
.
A buyer with value v ∈ [1, 2) gets negative utility from the third outcome alone. His risk-averse
utility is
−2 + (v)y(1) + (2− v)y(3/4) + (v − 1)y(1/4) =
1
2
v −
15
16
.
Finally, a buyer with value v ≥ 2 gets positive utility from every outcome. His risk-averse utility is
(v − 2)y(1/2) + (1)y(1/4) =
1
4
v −
7
16
.
0 1 2 3
v
−1
−
1
2
0
u
y
(v
,(
X
,P
))
Figure 3: The risk-averse utility as a function of v for a buyer evaluating the lottery described in
Example 5. Notice that the utility is a concave function of v.
In general, the utility uy(v, (X,P )) that a buyer derives from a lottery (X,P ) is a concave
function. See Appendix A for a proof.
Lemma 1. For any y and lottery (X,P ), uy(v, (X,P )) is a concave function of v. The slope of
this function lies between 1− y(1− x) and y(x), where x = Pr[X = 1].
We will make extensive use of a particularly simple lottery which has just two outcomes: with
some probability the buyer is allocated the item and charged a deterministic price; with the re-
maining probability, both the allocation and price are 0. We refer to such a lottery as a binary
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lottery, and denote it by the pair (x, p) where x ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of allocation and p is the
price charged upon allocation. The buyer’s utility function for a binary lottery has a convenient
form—it is linear for v ≥ p. In particular, when v > p, uy(v, (x, p)) = y(x)(v − p). See Figure 4.
p v
0
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y
(v
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x
,p
))
Figure 4: The utility curve for a buyer with weighting function y evaluating a binary lottery. The
lottery allocates with probability x and charges p only when the item is allocated. Notice that the
curve is linear above zero; the slope here is y(x).
3.2 Optimal Mechanisms.
When the buyer is risk-neutral, the utility that the buyer receives as a function of his value in any
IC mechanism is a concave function. This property allows for convenient analysis of optimal mech-
anisms. For a risk-averse buyer, this is no longer necessarily true. For example, if the mechanism
offers a single lottery with more than two outcomes, as in Example 5, the buyer’s utility function
is concave on its support. In general, the buyer’s utility function is the maximum over concave
functions.
We now study properties of revenue optimal mechanisms for a single buyer. We will show that
revenue optimal mechanisms can be described by a menu composed of binary lotteries, and always
induce a convex utility curve. We also observe that payment of such a mechanism is explicitly
determined by the allocation, and that optimal revenue weakly increases with risk aversion.
Theorem 1. For any revenue-optimal IC mechanism (X,P) in the single-shot setting, the buyer’s
utility function uy(v, (Xv , Pv)) is convex and nondecreasing. Furthermore, there exists an optimal
ex-post IR mechanism that can be described as a menu of binary lotteries.
The proof of this theorem is defered to Appendix A. At a high-level, our proof proceeds as
follows. We start with an arbitrary IC mechanism, and consider the buyer’s utility function induced
by this mechanism. We then take the lower convex envelope of this function (see Figure 5). We
show that every point on this curve can be supported by the utility curve of a binary lottery which
has an expected payment as least that of the menu option it replaces in the original mechanism.
At points where the lower convex envelope is strictly below the original utility curve, the new
mechanism obtains strictly more revenue.
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Figure 5: Left: The utility curve for a menu of lotteries as a function of the buyer’s value is
the pointwise maximum of the utility curves of the individual lotteries. Right: The lower convex
envelope of the utility curve corresponds to a menu of binary lotteries which, by Theorem 1, obtains
at least as much revenue as the original menu.
Payment Identity.
Consider a mechanism that offers the buyer a menu of binary lotteries. The utility of a menu
option (x, p) for a buyer with value v is y(x)(v−p). This form permits a standard payment identity
analysis, and gives the following identity for any IC mechanism:
y(x(v))p(v) = y(x(v))v −
∫ v
0
y(x(z)) dz. (2)
Unfortunately, unlike the risk-neutral setting, this payment identity does not lead to an expression
for the mechanism’s revenue that is linear in the allocation function, and so does not allow a
Myerson-type theorem characterizing optimal mechanisms.
3.3 Optimal Revenue Approaches Social Welfare.
As we observed earlier, the optimal revenue in general exceeds Myerson’s revenue when the buyer
is risk-averse. But to what extent? We now show that as long as the buyer is sufficiently risk-
averse, the seller can extract nearly the entire expected value of the buyer as revenue, regardless of
the buyer’s value distribution. This stands in contrast to the risk-neutral setting where for some
distributions (e.g. the equal revenue distribution), the revenue-welfare gap can be unbounded.
More generally, Lemma 2 in the following subsection shows that the revenue of every IC mechanism
composed of binary lotteries increases weakly with increasing aversion to risk.
Theorem 2. For every ε > 0 and H > 1, if the buyer’s weighting function satisfies y(1−ε) ≤ 2−H/ε,
there exists a mechanism that for any value distribution F supported over [1,H] obtains revenue at
least 1−O(ε) times the buyer’s expected value Ev∼F [v].
Proof. Fix the parameters ε, H, and y, as specified in the theorem statement. Consider a mechanism
that has H/ε menu options of the form (xi, yi) = (y
−1(2−(i−1)),H − iε).
We first claim that for any value v, among all of the menu options corresponding to prices
H − iε ≤ v− ε, the buyer prefers the option with the maximum price. This follows from observing
that 2−(i−1)(v−(H−iε)) ≥ 2−(i
′−1)(v−(H−i′ε)), or equivalently, 2i
′−i ≥ 1+((i′−i)ε)/(v−(H−iε)).
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The last inequality follows from noting that v−(H− iε) ≥ ε, and therefore, 1+ (i
′−i)ε
v−(H−iε) ≤ 1+ i
′− i
which is at most 2i
′−i for i′ − i ≥ 1.
Note that any menu option with a positive payment has allocation at least y−1(2−(H/ε−1)).
Then
Rev(M) =
∫ H
0
f(v)x(v)p(v)dv
≥ y−1(2−(H/ε−1))
∫ H
0
f(v)(v − 2ε)dv.
Then Rev(M) ≥ y−1(2−(H/ε−1))(E[v] − 2ε) where E[v] is the social welfare. The theorem now
follows by recalling that y−1(2−(H/ε−1)) ≥ 1− ε.
We note that the extreme risk aversion required by the statement of Theorem 2 is unrealistic;
we address this in Section 3.4.2.
3.4 Risk-Robust Approximations to Revenue.
We now turn to the problem of designing near-optimal mechanisms without detailed knowledge of
the buyer’s weighting function. As discussed in the introduction, it is unreasonable to expect the
seller to possess precise information about the buyer’s risk attitude. We therefore ask whether it
is possible to design a mechanism that simultaneously approximates the optimal revenue for any
risk attitude. Theorem 2 suggests that this is challenging: for some value distributions supported
over [1,H], as we vary the buyer’s weighting function, the optimal revenue can vary by a factor as
large as Θ(logH).
Formally, we say that a mechanism defined by menuM achieves an α risk-robust approximation
to revenue for value distribution F over class Y of weighting functions, if for all y ∈ Y,
Revy,F (M) ≥ αOPT(y, F ).
Achieving a risk-robust approximation to revenue requires understanding how the revenue of a
mechanism changes as the buyer’s risk attitude changes. Ideally, since the optimal revenue tends
to increase as the buyer gets more and more risk averse, we would require that the revenue of
our robust mechanism also increases in tandem. We show that this is indeed true for mechanisms
composed of binary lotteries under a certain assumption about how risk aversion increases.
3.4.1 An O(log logH) risk-robust approximation to revenue.
Consider a family of weighting functions Y. We say that Y is non-crossing if for all pairs of functions
y1 and y2 in Y, for all x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1], y1(x1) ≥ y2(x1) implies y1(x2) ≥ y2(x2). In other words, one
function always lies above the other – they never cross. We express this relationship between the
functions as y1 ≥ y2. We say that the family Y is monotone if for all pairs of functions y1 ≥ y2 in
Y, y2(x)/y1(x) is monotone non-decreasing in x. In other words, y2 is relatively more risk-averse
at small probabilities than at large probabilities.
Lemma 2. Let Y be a monotone non-crossing family of weighting functions, and let y1 ≥ y2 be
any two weighting functions in Y. Then, for any IC mechanism M composed of binary lotteries,
we have Revy2,F (M) ≥ Revy1,F (M).
14
This lemma follows by observing that a buyer with weighting function y2 selects a menu option
inM that is no cheaper than the menu option a buyer with the same value but weighting function
y1 selects. We show in Appendix A.2 that the monotonicity property of the family Y is necessary
to obtain this revenue monotonicity.
Proof. Fix a value v. We abuse notation and write y1(v) to mean y1(x(v)), and similarly with
y2 and bid b. By incentive compatibility of M, y1(v)(v − p(v)) ≥ y1(b)(v − p(b)) for all b. By
assumption and monotonicity of x(v) in v, for any b < v, y2(v)/y1(v) ≥ y2(b)/y1(b). Multiplying
these inequalities gives
y2(v)
y1(v)
y1(v)(v − p(v)) ≥
y2(b)
y1(b)
y1(b)(v − p(b)),
or equivalently
y2(v)(v − p(v)) ≥ y2(b)(v − p(b)).
Therefore, a buyer v will not underreport his value, and so the revenue of M can only increase
under y2.
An implication of this lemma is that if the optimal revenues under weighting functions y1 and
y2 are close, then a mechanism that is approximately optimal for y1 continues to be approximately
optimal for y2. This observation allows us to develop a mechanism that obtains a risk-robust
O(log logH) approximation to revenue over monotone non-crossing families of weighting functions.
Observe that this approximation factor is exponentially smaller than the range of optimal revenues
for the different risk attitudes.
Our mechanism chooses log logH representative weighting functions from the given family, and
then picks a random one of the optimal menus from each family. We note that this is only an
existential and not a computationally efficient result.
Theorem 3. Let Y be a monotone non-crossing family of weighting functions and let F be a value
distribution supported on [0,H]. Then there exists a mechanism M that for any weighting function
in Y achieves an O(log logH) approximation to revenue. Formally, for all y ∈ Y,
Revy,F (M) ≥ Ω
(
1
log logH
)
OPT(y, F ).
Proof. Since Y is a non-crossing family of functions, the relation ≥ defines a total ordering over
the functions. We say that y1 is larger than y2 if y1 ≥ y2.
Let n be a constant to be determined later. For i ∈ {0, · · · , n}, let ki = E[v] /(logH)
i/n.
Observe that k0 is the buyer’s expected value and kn is a lower bound on the revenue of Myerson’s
mechanism. Therefore, for all y ∈ Y, we have kn ≤ OPT(y, F ) ≤ k0.
Let Yi = {y ∈ Y : ki ≤ OPT(y, F ) < ki−1}, and let yi be the largest (i.e. least risk-
averse) weighting function in Yi. Define Mi to be the revenue-optimal mechanism for yi, that
is, Revyi,F (Mi) = OPT(yi, F ).
We now claim that a mechanism that randomly chooses one of the mechanisms Mi to offer to
the agent achieves the desired risk robust approximation.
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Consider some y ∈ Y and suppose that this weighting function belongs to the set Yi. With
probability 1/n, we choose to run the mechanism Mi. Now we observe:
OPT(y, F ) ≤ (logH)1/nOPT(yi, F )
= (logH)1/nRevyi,F (Mi) (by definition of Mi)
≤ (logH)1/nRevy,F (Mi) (by Lemma 2)
Therefore, we get an approximation factor of n(logH)1/n, which is minimized at n = log logH.
3.4.2 Risk-robust approximation via Myerson’s mechanism.
Theorem 3 is unsatisfying for two reasons. One, finding the mechanism that achieves the revenue
guarantee in the theorem appears challenging. Second, the theorem works only for certain families
of weighting functions, and not for arbitrary ones.
We now consider risk-robust approximation from a different viewpoint. We observe that ob-
taining the high revenue guaranteed by Theorem 2 requires the buyer to heavily discount any
probabilities that are bounded away from 1. Such extreme risk aversion is unrealistic. We therefore
focus on weighting functions that map some probabilities bounded away from 1 (i.e. x = 1−Θ(1))
to weights bounded away from 0 (i.e. y(x) = Θ(1)). In other words, the weighting function is β-
bounded for some β = Θ(1) (Definition 3). We show that for such weighting functions, Myerson’s
mechanism already achieves an approximation to the optimal revenue. Of course, Myerson’s mech-
anism is defined independently of the buyer’s risk attitude. This therefore implies a risk-robust
approximation.
Theorem 4. For any β-bounded convex weighting function y, and any value distribution F , we
have
Mye(F ) ≥ βOPT(y, F ).
To understand the intuition behind this theorem, consider a β-bounded convex weighting func-
tion y, and letM = (x(v), p(v)) denote any mechanism composed of binary lotteries. We now make
two observations. First, this mechanism cannot obtain too much revenue from low-probability al-
locations. Intuitively, this is because if most of its revenue came from buyers who purchase the
low-probability allocations, it could extract much more revenue from these buyers by selling to
them with higher probability. Second, when the allocation probability is large, the buyer faces
less risk, and so the mechanism behaves nearly like the optimal risk-neutral mechanism. We now
formalize this intuition.
Lemma 3. Let M = (x(v), p(v)) denote an IC mechanism composed of binary lotteries for value
distribution F and weighting function y. Then, for any type t,∫ t
0
f(v)x(v)p(v)dv ≤ x(t)OPT(y, F ).
Proof. We examine an alternate mechanism that increases the probability of allocation to types
below t by a factor of 1x(t) . Consider the alternate mechanism Mˆ with allocation rule xˆ(b) =
x(b)
x(t) if
b < t, and 1 otherwise, and payment rule pˆ(b) = p(b). Note that this mechanism is not truthful; in
16
particular, an agent with value v may choose a menu option (xˆ(b), pˆ(b)) for b 6= v. We will show,
however, that an agent will never deviate to a bid below his true value, and will continue to pay a
price at least as high as in M.
For convenience, we abuse notation and write y(x(v)) as y(v) and y(xˆ(v)) as yˆ(v). BecauseM is
incentive compatible, for any v and w < v, we have that u(v, v) = (v−p(v))y(v) ≥ (v−p(w))y(w) =
u(v,w). The weighting function y is positive, increasing, and convex as a function of x, and so
yˆ(v)
y(v) =
y(x(v)/x(t))
y(x(v)) is nondecreasing in v for v ≤ t. Therefore
yˆ(w)
yˆ(v)
(v − p(w)) ≤
y(w)
y(v)
(v − p(w)) ≤ (v − p(v)),
so uˆ(v,w) = yˆ(w)(v − p(w)) ≤ yˆ(v)(v − p(v)) = uˆ(v, v), and the buyer will not underreport. Let
b(v) be the optimal bid for buyer v in mechanism Mˆ; then
Rev(Mˆ) ≥
∫ t
0
f(v)xˆ(b(v))p(b(v))dv
≥
1
x(t)
∫ t
0
f(v)x(v)p(v)dv,
and the lemma follows.
Lemma 4. Let M = (x(v), p(v)) denote an IC mechanism composed of binary lotteries for value
distribution F and weighting function y. Then, for any type t,∫ ∞
t
f(v)x(v)p(v)dv ≤
1
y(t)
Mye(F )
Proof. Let p˜(v) = p(v)y(x(v)). Then the payment identity in Equation (2) implies that the mecha-
nism (y(x(v)), p˜(v)) is IC for a risk-neutral buyer. Therefore, noting that x(v) ≤ 1 and y(v) ≥ y(t)
for all v ≥ t, we have ∫ ∞
t
f(v)x(v)p(v)dv =
∫ ∞
t
f(v)
x(v)
y(v)
p˜(v)dv
≤
1
y(t)
∫ ∞
t
f(v)p˜(v)dv
≤
1
y(t)
∫ ∞
0
f(v)p˜(v)dv
≤
1
y(t)
Mye(F ).
We can now combine the two lemmas into a proof for Theorem 4.
Proof. Theorem 4 Let M = (x(v), p(v)) be an optimal mechanism for value distribution F and
weighting function y. Let t be any type at which (1 − x(t))y(x(t)) ≥ β. By the definition of
β-boundedness, such a type exists.
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By Lemma 3, we have
OPT ≤
(
1
1− x(t)
)∫ ∞
t
f(v)x(v)p(v)dv,
which, using Lemma 4, gives
≤
1
(1− x(t))y(t)
Mye(F ) ≤
1
β
Mye(F ).
4 Two-Stage Revenue Maximization
We now turn to a setting in which the seller has two items to sell to the buyer in succession. We will
denote the buyer’s values for the two items by v1 and v2. The values are drawn from independent
distributions with c.d.f.s F1 and F2, and the buyer’s value for receiving both of the items is v1+ v2.
The mechanism proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the seller announces a mechanism by
which to sell the first item and the buyer reveals v1. At this time, neither the buyer nor the seller
knows the buyer’s value for the second item. The buyer must report his value to the first-stage
mechanism before learning v2. At the start of the second stage, the seller announces a second
mechanism, which may depend on the buyer’s first-stage decision, by which to sell the second item.
Properties of two-stage mechanisms. A two-stage mechanism is incentive-compatible if for
any report v1 during the first stage, the second-stage mechanism is incentive-compatible with
respect to reporting v2, and the combination of the first- and second-stage mechanisms is incentive-
compatible with respect to reporting v1. We further impose the constraint of ex-post IR which
states that the price charged to the buyer in either stage cannot exceed the ex-post value obtained
by the buyer in that stage.
Recall that OPT(y, F1) and OPT(y, F2) denote the optimal revenue that the seller can obtain
by selling items 1 and 2 respectively via independent mechanisms (such as posting a fixed price
in each stage). We will denote by OPT(y, F ) the optimal revenue achievable by an incentive-
compatible ex-post IR mechanism for the two stages combined, where F = F1 × F2 denotes the
joint distribution over (v1, v2).
Of course, OPT(y, F ) ≥ OPT(y, F1)+OPT(y, F2), but in fact, the former can be much larger
than the latter sum. Observe that the second-stage mechanism can depend on the buyer’s first-
stage report. This gives the seller some flexibility in extracting more revenue in the first stage.
Ashlagi, Daskalakis, and Haghpanah [2] show, in particular, that for risk-neutral buyers the seller
can charge a premium on the first stage in exchange for more utility in the second stage, which in
some settings allows the seller to extract almost the entire second-stage social welfare as revenue.
We will show that a similar result is achievable under our model of risk aversion.
A two-stage mechanism can be described without loss of generality as a menu of options with
each option being a three-tuple of random variables (X,P,M), where X is an indicator variable
representing the allocation of item 1 to the agent, P is the price to be paid in stage one, and M
is an incentive-compatible mechanism for the second stage. Let U(v2,M) be a random variable
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denoting the ex-post utility that the agent obtains from mechanism M in stage two. Then, the
buyer’s risk-averse utility from the menu option (X,P,M) in stage one is given by
Ey[v1X − P + U(v2,M)] ,
where the weighted expectation is taken over the randomness in the mechanisms as well as the
randomness in the agent’s second-stage value. In the first stage, the agent chooses the menu option
that maximizes his risk-averse utility.
Observe that once again X,P, and M can be arbitrarily correlated. In particular, the contri-
bution of the second-stage mechanism M to the buyer’s risk-averse utility in stage one can depend
not only on the chosen menu option and his expected v2, but also on his actual value v1. This
makes it challenging to reason about the choices of the agent and account for the contribution of
the agent’s second-stage utility to the first-stage revenue, as we see in the following example.
Example 6. Consider a menu option that with probability x allocates the first item to the bidder
and charges him p, and then always gives the second item away for free. Then with probability
1 − F2(v2), the buyer gets utility of at least v2 from the second item. Suppose v2 ∼ U{1, 2}. Let
y(x) = x2 for all x. We will compute the utility of the buyer from this menu option at different first-
stage values. Observe that although the menu option, in particular the second-stage mechanism,
stays the same, the contribution of the first- and second-stage mechanisms to the buyer’s utility
vary as v1 varies.
Case 1: v − p ≥ 2. Getting the first item is worth more than any second-stage utility alone.
Then the buyer’s utility is
y(1)1 + y((1− x)/2)(2 − 1)
+ y(x)(v − p− 2) + y(x/2)(2)
= x2(v − p) + 1 +
(1− x)2
4
−
3x2
2
.
Case 2: v − p ∈ (1, 2). Getting the second item when his value is high is worth more than just
getting the first item. His utility from this mechanism is
y(1)1 + y((1 − x)/2)(v − p− 1) + y(1/2)(2 − (v − p)) + y(x/2)(v − p)
=
x(x− 1)
2
(v − p) +
3
2
−
(1− x)2
4
.
In the case where p = 1, x = 1/2, y = x2, and v is 4 in the first case and 2.5 in the second, we get that
the first case has utility 12/16+11/16 = 23/16 and the second case has utility −3/16+23/16 = 5/4.
We focus on a simple and practical class of mechanisms, namely posted-price mechanisms, that
in addition to OPT(y, F1)+OPT(y, F2) can in some cases obtain an additional Ey[v2] in revenue,
matching results known for the risk-neutral setting.
4.1 Posted-price mechanisms and their revenue properties.
A two-stage posted-price mechanism is specified by a menu, where each menu option is a pair of
prices (p1, p2). If the buyer selects this menu option, he is offered item 1 at a price of p1 and
promised item 2 at a price of p2. Observe that the buyer makes this choice knowing v1 but not
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knowing v2. The buyer would potentially be willing to pay a higher price for item 1 if in return he
is promised a lower price for item 2. Accordingly, the undominated menu options14 correspond to
higher first-stage prices being coupled with lower second-stage prices and vice versa.
In the remainder of this section, we use the notation PPℓ to represent a two-stage posted-price
mechanism that offers menu options (p, ℓ(p)) for every price p in some range, where ℓ(·) is a non-
increasing function mapping the first-stage price to the corresponding second-stage price.15
The buyer’s optimization problem. Fix a posted-price mechanism PPℓ, and consider a buyer
with probability weighting function y and first-stage value v1. Observe that if the buyer purchases
the menu option (p, ℓ(p)), he gets utility of v1 − p with probability 1, and expects to obtain some
(random) utility from the second-stage posted price of ℓ(p). The risk-averse expectation of the
buyer’s second-stage utility from posted price p2 can be written as
U(p2) := Ey[max(0, v2 − p2)]
=
∫ ∞
0
y(1− F2(z + p2))dz
=
∫ ∞
p2
y(1− F2(z))dz.
Accordingly, the buyer’s risk-averse utility in the first stage from purchasing option (p, ℓ(p)) is
v1 − p+ U(ℓ(p)).
The menu option (p, ℓ(p)) gives the buyer the same utility as offering an “effective price” of p −
U(ℓ(p)) in a single-shot mechanism. Accordingly, the buyer chooses the menu option corresponding
to the minimal p−U(ℓ(p)) over all prices that he can afford, that is, with p ≤ v1. Then without loss
of generality, the mechanism contains menu options with effective prices that are non-increasing in
the first-stage price, as otherwise they would be dominated. We assume without loss of generality
that the buyer breaks ties across menu options with equal effective prices in favor of the largest
first-stage price.
Example 7. Consider a buyer with v1, v2 ∼ U [0, 1] and probability weighting function y(x) = x
2.
Consider the mechanism that offers menu options (0, 1), (16 ,
1
2), and (
1
3 , 0). Note that U(ℓ(p)) =∫ 1
ℓ(p)(1− v2)
2dv2. Then U(1) = 0, U(0) =
1
3 , and U(
1
2) ≈ 0.04. This gives
Option Utility
(0, 1) v − 0 + U(1) = v(
1
6 ,
1
2
)
v − 16 + U
(
1
2
)
≈ v − 0.13(
1
3 , 0
)
v − 13 + U(0) = v
14A menu option is dominated by another if the buyer prefers the latter to the former regardless of his value for
the first item.
15Observe that this notation captures menus with a finite number of options. In particular, if the function ℓ(p) is
constant over a range of prices p, then all options other than the smallest price in that range are dominated, and
effectively not present in the menu.
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Then a buyer with v ∈ [0, 13) will purchase the option (0, 1); a buyer with v ∈ [
1
3 , 1] will purchase
the option (13 , 1); and no buyer will purchase the option (
1
6 ,
1
2), as it is dominated by the other
options with cheaper effective prices of 0 < 0.13.
The seller’s revenue.
We now present an upper bound on the revenue achievable via two-stage posted-price mechanisms.
Theorem 5. The revenue of any two-stage posted-price mechanism for a buyer with value distri-
bution F1 × F2 and probability weighting function y is upper-bounded by
Mye(F1) +Mye(F2) +Ev1∼F1 [min(v1,Ey[v2])] .
Proof. We will account for the seller’s revenue in the two stages separately. Observe first that
regardless of the buyer’s first-stage value, the revenue obtained by the seller in the second stage is
no more than Mye(F2).
Now let’s consider the seller’s first-stage revenue. Let pmin denote the smallest price offered in
stage one. Because the “effective price” is non-increasing as a function of the first-stage price, we
have p− U(ℓ(p)) ≤ pmin − U(ℓ(pmin)), hence
p ≤ pmin − U(ℓ(pmin)) + U(ℓ(p)) ≤ pmin + U(0),
where U(0) = Ey[v2] is the risk-averse expectation of the buyer’s second-stage value.
On the other hand, the buyer never pays more than v1 in the first stage. Therefore, the seller’s
first-stage revenue, when the buyer’s first-stage value is v1 ≥ pmin, is bounded by min(v1, pmin +
U(0)). We can now bound the seller’s first-stage revenue by
Ev1∼F1 [min(v1, pmin + U(0))]
≤ pmin(1− F1(pmin)) +Ev1∼F1 [min(v1, U(0))]
≤Mye(F1) +Ev1∼F1 [min(v1, U(0))]
We will now show that there exists a simple posted-pricing mechanism that achieves a 2-
approximation to the upper bound in Theorem 5.
Theorem 6. For the two-stage setting described above, there exists a posted-price mechanism PPℓ
that obtains revenue at least
1
2
(Mye(F1) +Mye(F2) +Ev1∼F1 [min(v1,Ey[v2])]) .
Proof. Charging the optimal single-shot posted-price in each stage already obtains revenueMye(F1)+
Mye(F2). We will now describe a posted-price mechanism PPℓ that obtains revenue at least
Ev1∼F1 [min(v1, U(0))]. The intuition that a mechanism can achieve this is as follows: if every
menu option charges a price p but guarantees utility equal to p back in the next stage, then the
buyer will be willing to pay any price subject to ex-post IR. The better of these two mechanisms
achieves the bound stated in the lemma.
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The mechanism PPℓ offers menu options (p, ℓ(p)) with ℓ(p) = U
−1(p) for all p ∈ [0, U(0)]. Observe
that since U is continuous and ranges from U(∞) = 0 to U(0), for every p in the range [0, U(0)], a
second-stage price ℓ(p) = U−1(p) exists, and therefore the mechanism is properly defined.
Furthermore, for every menu option, (p, ℓ(p)), we have p − U(ℓ(p)) = p − p = 0. So all menu
options bring the same effective utility to the buyer on the first stage, and by default the buyer
purchases the most expensive one that he can afford. Consequently, the seller’s first-stage revenue
is given by min(v1, U(0)), and the theorem follows.
4.2 Risk-robust approximation.
We now turn to risk-robust approximation in the two-stage setting. Observe that the results of
Section 3 already imply that we can obtain a risk-robust approximation to the single-shot revenue
achievable in each stage independently, when the buyer’s weighting function is bounded (Defini-
tion 3). Can we obtain a risk-robust approximation to the last term in the bound given by Lemma 5,
namely, E[min(v1,Ey[v2])]?
In this section we argue that this last term cannot be extracted via a posted-pricing mechanism
in a risk-robust manner even if all of the possible weighting functions for the buyer are bounded.16
This fact leads to Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. No posted-price mechanism can obtain a constant-factor risk-robust approximation to
revenue in the two-stage dynamic setting. This holds even if all of the relevant weighting functions
are Θ(1)-bounded.
At a high-level, the idea behind our construction is as follows. We choose the family of weighting
functions and the second-stage value distribution in such a way that although all of the weighting
functions satisfy the boundedness property, they cover a large range of weighted expectations for
the second-stage value, placing different constraints on the first-stage menu. Intuitively, in order to
extract enough revenue, the seller must offer a menu with many different prices, indeed a continuum
of first-stage prices. Then, to incentivize the buyer to pay as high a price as he can afford in the
first stage, the seller must provide a discount over the second stage’s price. The extent of discount
provided depends on the most risk-averse weighting function for which the effective menu contains
the corresponding option. As the buyer goes from being very risk-averse to almost risk-neutral,
the seller needs to offer a bigger and bigger discount for higher and higher first-stage prices, and
eventually runs out of discounts to offer.
We now make this formal. Consider a two-stage mechanism design setting where the buyer’s
value for the first stage is distributed according to the unbounded equal revenue distribution, that
is, F1(v1) = 1 − 1/v1 for v1 ≥ 1, and his second-stage value is distributed according to the equal
revenue distribution bounded at en, that is, F2(v2) = 1− 1/v2 for v2 ∈ [1, e
n]. We will consider a
family Y of weighting functions parameterized by ε ∈ [0, 1] as follows.
yǫ(x) =
{
x2 for x ∈ [0, ε]
(1 + ε)x− ε for x ∈ [ε, 1]
16Observe, of course, that if the risk averse expectation of the buyer’s second-stage value does not differ much
across the different weighting functions, then we can use ideas from Section 3 to extract the optimal revenue in a
risk-robust manner.
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In words, yǫ(x) is equal to x
2 up to ε, and then rises linearly to yǫ(1) = 1. Observe that each
function in this family is convex and at least 1/8-bounded.
Suppose that M = {(p, ℓ(p))}p∈P for some P ⊂ R≥0 is a menu that achieves a risk-robust
c-approximation, c > 1, with respect to the family Y. Let Pε ⊆ P index the “effective menu” when
the buyer’s weighting function is yǫ, i.e., the set of first-stage prices corresponding to menu options
that the buyer actually purchases at some value. Any option indexed by p ∈ P \ Pε is dominated.
Recall that Uε(ℓ(p)) is the risk-averse utility that a buyer with weighting function yǫ obtains
from the second-stage mechanism when he chooses first-stage price p:
Uε(ℓ(p)) =
{∫ en
ℓ(p) yǫ(1/v2)dv2 for ℓ(p) ≥ 1
1− ℓ(p) +
∫ en
1 yǫ(1/v2)dv2 otherwise.
We make the following observations about effective menus. See Appendix A.3 for proofs.
Lemma 5. For the setting described above, if {(p, ℓ(p))}p∈P gives a risk-robust c-approximation,
the following properties hold without loss of generality:
1. For all p ∈ P , ℓ(p) ≥ 1.
2. For any ε, Pε ⊇ [1, pε] where pε is defined such that
1 +Ev∼F1 [min(v, pε)] =
1
c
Ev∼F1 [min(v, Uε(0))] .
3. For every ε, pε = αcUε(0)
1/c for some constant αc > 0 depending only on c.
4. For every ε, the left derivative of Uε(ℓ(p)) with respect to p at p = pε must be ≥ 1.
Informally, the first property holds because second-stage prices below 1 lose as much second-
stage revenue as they gain on the first stage; the second property is a consequence of minimizing
the required second-stage discounts; the third follows by solving Equation (2); the fourth follows
from the assumption that prices in Pε are undominated.
We can now derive a differential equation for the function ℓ(p). First,
d Uε(ℓ(p))
dp
=
{
−yǫ(1/ℓ(p))ℓ
′(p) when ℓ(p) ≥ 1
−ℓ′(p) otherwise.
Then, Lemma 5 (4) implies
−ℓ′(p) ≥
{
1
yεp(1/ℓ(p))
when ℓ(p) ≥ 1
1 otherwise,
(3)
where, for any price p, εp is the value of ε for which p = pε as given by Equation (2). We have the
following two boundary conditions:
ℓ(1) ≤ en and (4)
ℓ(p) > 1 for p < p0. (5)
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The first enforces that the second-stage price at p = 1 be no more than the maximum value that
v2 takes. The second follows from Lemma 5 (1).
We use ℓ˜(p) to denote the solution to Equations (3) and (4), each with inequality replaced by
equality. So ℓ˜(p) gives an upper bound on ℓ(p). We will show that, for large enough n, a solution
to (3) which satisfies (4) cannot also satisfy (5).
The following claim will be useful; a proof appears in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 6. For all ε, Uε(0) ≥ min{ln 1/ε, n}.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 7.
Proof. Theorem 7 By Lemma 5 (3), pε = αcUε(0)
1/c. Fix ε∗ = e−(2/αc)
c
, and let N = (2/αc)
c.
Then, by Lemma 6, for all n > N ,
pε∗ ≥ αc(ln 1/ε
∗)1/c = 2.
Note that ε∗ ≤ εp ≤ 1 for all p ∈ [1, 2].
We now show that ℓ˜(2) is at most 1/ε∗ for all n > N . Suppose not. Then, for all p ∈ [1, 2],
ℓ˜(p) ≥ ℓ˜(2) and εp ≥ ε
∗ implies that ℓ˜(p) > 1/εp, or 1/ℓ˜(p) < εp. So by the definition of yǫ we have
yεp(1/ℓ˜(p)) = ℓ˜(p)
−2. Thus the differential equation (3) simplifies to −ℓ˜′(p) = ℓ˜(p)2 for p ∈ [1, 2].
The solution, incorporating the boundary condition ℓ˜(1) = en, is
ℓ˜(p) =
1
e−n + p− 1
,
and so ℓ˜(2) = 1/(e−n + 1) < 1, a contradiction.
But if ℓ˜(2) is bounded above by 1/ε∗, we can argue that ℓ(p) ≤ ℓ˜(p) = 1 at some p < p0,
contradicting the boundary condition (5). Specifically, Equation (3) gives ℓ˜′(p) ≤ −1 for all ℓ˜(p) ≥ 1,
so ℓ˜(1/ε∗ + 1) ≤ ℓ˜(2)− (1/ε∗ − 1) ≤ 1. On the other hand, by Lemma 5 (3), p0 ∝ n
1/c, so for large
enough n we have p0 > 1/ε
∗ + 1.
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A Deferred proofs
A.1 Utility curves and a characterization of optimal single-shot mechanisms.
The proofs in this section lead up to the conclusion of Theorem 1: both the optimal mechanism
and the risk-averse utility that the buyer gets from it have a simple structure.
Lemma 7. For any profile y and lottery (X,P ), uy(v, (X,P )) is a concave function of v. The
slope of this function lies between 1− y(1− x) and y(x), where x = Pr[X = 1].
Proof. We assume that (X,P ) satisfies Pr[P = 0 |X = 0] = 1. Let FP (p) = Pr[P ≤ p |X = 1]. We
further assume that FP is differentiable, with p.m.f. fP . We make these assumptions for simplicity;
both can be relaxed. By definition,
uy(v, (X,P )) = −
∫ ∞
0
(1− y(Pr[vX − P ≥ −z])) dz +
∫ ∞
0
y(Pr[vX − P ≥ z])dz.
For z ≥ 0,
Pr[vX − P ≥ −z] = 1−Pr[X = 1]Pr[P ≥ v + z |X = 1]
= 1− x(1− FP (v + z)),
and
Pr[vX − P ≥ z] = 1−Pr[X = 1]Pr[P ≥ v − z |X = 1]−Pr[X = 0]
= 1− x(1− FP (v − z))− (1− x)
= xFP (v − z).
Therefore,
u′y(v) =
∫ ∞
0
y′ (1− x(1− FP (v + z))) xfP (v + z)dz
+
∫ ∞
0
y′ (xFP (v − z)) xfP (v − z)dz
= y
(
1− x+ xFP (v + z)
)∣∣∞
z=0
− y
(
xFP (v − z)
)∣∣∞
z=0
= 1− y(1− x+ xFP (v)) + y(xFP (v)).
Note that when FP (v) = 1 (i.e., when v is greater than the maximum price charged), u
′
y(v) =
y(x). Similarly, when FP (v) = 0, u
′
y(v) = 1− y(1− x). In either case, u
′
y(v) ≥ 0.
Finally, to show concavity, we show u′′y(v) ≤ 0:
u′′y(v) = xfP (v)
[
y′(xFP (v)) − y
′(1− x+ xFP (v))
]
.
The first term, xfP (v), is always nonnegative. Note that 1 − x + xFP (v) ≥ xFP (v). Since y is
convex and increasing, y′(1− x+ xFP (v)) ≥ y
′(xFP (v)), and so u
′′
y(v) ≤ 0.
Lemma 8. Fix any (allocation, payment) pair (X,P ). Let (x, p) be the lottery that sells with
probability x = Pr[X = 1] and charges p = E[P ] /x. Then, assuming payments are non-negative,
uy(v, (x, p)) ≥ uy(v, (X,P )) for all v.
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Proof. First observe that E[vX − P ] = x(v − p), but we can also write it as
E[vX − P ] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr[Z > z] dz −
∫ 0
−∞
(1−Pr[Z > z])dz
where Z = vX − P and it may range from −∞ to ∞. Then
uy(v, (x, p)) = y(x)(v − p)
=
y(x)
x
x(v − p)
=
y(x)
x
E[vX − P ] .
Recall that y(x)/x is non-decreasing in x by convexity of y. As in the proof of Lemma 1, we assume
(X,P ) satisfies Pr[P = 0 |X = 0] = 1 (this can be relaxed). Then if Z > 0, it must be that X = 1,
hence Pr[Z > 0] ≤ x. Then for the positive values that vX − P takes on, we have∫ ∞
0
y(x)
x
Pr[Z > z] dz ≥
∫ ∞
0
y(Pr[Z > z])
Pr[Z > z]
Pr[Z > z] dz
=
∫ ∞
0
y(Pr[Z > z])dz.
For the negative values that Xv − P takes on, by monotonicity of y(x)/x in x and because the
utility is negative, we have
−
y(x)
x
∫ 0
−∞
(1−Pr[Z > z])dz ≥ −
∫ 0
−∞
y(Pr[Z > z])
Pr[Z > z]
(1−Pr[Z > z])dz
≥ −
∫ 0
−∞
(1− y(Pr[Z > z]))dz
where the the second inequality follows from −y(Pr[Z>z])
Pr[Z>z] ≥ −1. All together,
uy(v, (x, p)) =
y(x)
x
E[Xv − P ]
≥
∫ ∞
0
y(Pr[Z > z])dz −
∫ 0
−∞
(1− y(Pr[Z > z]))dz
= uy(v, (X,P )).
Lemma 9. Fix y, and let (X,P ) be any (allocation, payment) pair. For any lottery (x, p) such
that there exists v with 0 ≤ uy(v, (x, p)) ≤ uy(v, (X,P )) and x ≥ Pr[X = 1], the expected revenue
of (x, p) is at least as large as the expected revenue of (X,P ). If uy(v, (x, p)) < uy(v, (X,P )), then
the revenue is strictly larger.
Proof. Let x′ = Pr[X = 1] and p′ = E[P ] /x′. Note that the expected revenue from (x′, p′) is
exactly E[P ]. By Lemma 8, uy(v, (X,P )) ≤ uy(v, (x
′, p′)). Since 0 ≤ uy(v, (x, p)) ≤ uy(v, (x
′, p′)),
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we have
y(x′)(v − p′) = uy(v, (x
′, p′))
≥ uy(v, (x, p))
= y(x)(v − p).
Since x ≥ x′ by assumption, y(x) ≥ y(x′). Therefore p ≥ p′, and so xp ≥ x′p′ = E[P ]. Note that if
uy(v, (X,P )) > uy(v, (x, p)), then xp > E[P ].
For any IC/IR mechanism (X,P ) defined on the interval [a, b], let
¯
u(v) be the lower convex
envelope of uy(v, (Xv , Pv)). That is,
¯
u is the maximal convex function upper bounded by the
utility curve.
Definition 4. For any convex function f : I → R, the subdifferential of f at x ∈ I is
¯
∂f(x) = {m : f(x′)− f(x) ≥ m(x′ − x) ∀x′ ∈ I}.
Likewise, for any concave function g : I → R, the superdifferential of g at x ∈ I is
∂¯g(x) = {m : g(x′)− g(x) ≤ m(x′ − x) ∀x′ ∈ I}.
Let
¯
∂∗f(x) = max{m ∈
¯
∂f(x)} be the maximal slope of a line tangent to f at x. Similarly,
define ∂¯
∗
g(x) = min{m ∈ ∂¯g(x)} to be the minimal slope of a line tangent to g at x.
Lemma 10.
¯
∂
¯
u(v) ⊆ [0, 1] for all v ∈ [a, b].
Proof. First,
¯
u(v) is an nondecreasing function of v because, by Lema 1, uy(v, (X,P )) is nonde-
creasing for all (X,P ) in M. So
¯
∂
¯
u(v) ⊆ [0,∞) for all v.
Let v∗ be any value in [a, b]. Since
¯
u(v) is the lower convex envelope of uy(v, (Xv , Pv)), there
exists v0 ≤ v
∗ such that for all v′ > v∗,
¯
∂∗
¯
u(v∗) ≤
uy(v
′, (Xv′ , Pv′))− uy(v0, (Xv0 , Pv0))
v′ − v0
≤
uy(v
′, (Xv′ , Pv′))− uy(v0, (Xv′ , Pv′))
v′ − v0
≤
v′ − v0
v′ − v0
= 1
The second inequality follows by the definition of (Xv0 , Pv0), and the third follows from Lemma 1
together with the fact that y(Pr[Pv′ = 1]) ≤ 1.
Theorem 1. For any revenue optimal IC mechanism (X,P) in the single-shot setting, the buyer’s
utility function uy(v, (Xv , Pv)) is convex and nondecreasing. Furthermore, there exists an optimal
ex-post IR mechanism that can be described as a menu of binary lotteries.
Proof. First, we show that we can find a menu of lotteries (x(v), p(v)) which obtain a utility curve
equal to
¯
u. Fix v0 ∈ [a, b]. Let m0 =
¯
∂∗
¯
u(v0). Note that if m0 = 0, then E[Xv0 ] = 0 by Lemma 1,
and so E[Pv0 ] = 0 by IR. So assume that m0 > 0. Let p = v0 − ¯
u(v0)/m0 and let x = y(m0). Since
¯
u(a) ≤ a and
¯
u(v) is convex and nondecreasing,
¯
u(v0) ≤ m0v0, so p ≥ 0. By Lemma 10, m0 ∈ [0, 1],
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so x is a well-defined probability. So (x, p) is a feasible lottery with utility curve tangent to
¯
u at
v0: uy(v0, (x, p)) = (v0 − p)y(x) =
¯
u(v0) and u
′
y(v0, (x, p)) = m0.
It remains to show that xp ≥ E[Pv0 ]. For ease of notation, let x0 = Pr[Xv0 = 1]. We will show
that the conditions of Lemma 9 are satisfied: namely, that x ≥ x0 and there exists v such that
0 ≤ uy(v, (x, p)) ≤ uy(v, (Xv0 , Pv0)). The latter condition is satisfied at v0 by construction, and the
second inequality is strict if
¯
u(v0) < uy(v, (Xv0 , Pv0)).
To show x ≥ x0, it suffices to show m0 ≥ y(x0). Suppose
¯
u(v0) = uy(v0, (Xv0 , Pv0)). It follows
that
m0 =
¯
∂∗
¯
u(v0)
≥ ∂¯
∗
uy(v0, (Xv0 , Pv0))
≥ y(x0).
The first inequality holds because
¯
u(v′) ≥ uy(v
′, (Xv0 , Pv0)) for all v
′ ≥ v0. The second follows by
Lemma 1.
Otherwise, if
¯
u(v0) < uy(v0, (Xv0 , Pv0)), there exists a point
17 v′ > v0 such that
¯
u(v′) =
uy(v
′, (Xv0 , Pv0)) and ¯
u(v′) =
¯
u(v0) +m0(v
′ − v0). Thus,
uy(v
′, (Xv0 , Pv0)) = ¯
u(v0) +m0(v
′ − v0)
≤ uy(v0, (Xv0 , Pv0)) +m0(v
′ − v0).
Rearranging and appealing to Lemma 1, we have
m0 ≥
uy(v
′, (Xv0 , Pv0))− uy(v0, (Xv0 , Pv0))
v′ − v0
≥ y(x0)
A.2 Monotonicity is required for Lemma 2.
The following example shows that the condition of monotonicity is necessary for Lemma 2.
Example 8. Suppose F is a point mass at v = 1, and M is a menu consisting of two lotteries:
x1 = 1 − 2ǫ/3, p1 = 3/4; and x2 = 1/2, p2 = ǫ. Let y1(x) = max(3x/2 − 1/2, x
2) and y2(x) = x
2.
Observe that y1 and y2 are non-crossing but not monotone.
Under y1, the buyer chooses the first lottery:
y1(x1)(1− p1) =
3
2
(1− 2ǫ/3)
1
4
= (1/4)(1 − ǫ)
= y1(x2)(1− p2).
The revenue under y1 is therefore ≈ 3/4.
17Possibly v′ = b. Note that
¯
u(b) = uy(b, (Xb, Pb)).
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However, under y2, the buyer chooses the second lottery:
y2(x1)(1− p1) = (1− 3ǫ/2)
2 1
4
<
1
4
(1− ǫ)
= y2(x2)(1− p2).
The revenue under y2 is therefore ǫ/2.
A.3 Lower bound for risk-robust approximation.
We will now prove Lemma 5.
Lemma 11. For the setting described in Section 4.2, if {(p, ℓ(p))}p∈P gives a risk-robust c-approximation,
the following properties hold without loss of generality:
1. For all p ∈ P , ℓ(p) ≥ 1.
2. For any ε, Pε ⊇ [1, pε] where pε is defined such that
1 +Ev∼F1 [min(v, pε)] =
1
c
Ev∼F1 [min(v, Uε(0))] .
3. For every ε, pε = αcUε(0)
1/c for some constant αc > 0 depending only on c.
4. For every ε, the left derivative of Uε(ℓ(p)) with respect to p at p = pε must be ≥ 1.
Proof. We prove the statements in sequence:
1. Suppose there is a menu option (p, ℓ(p)) for p ∈ P with ℓ(p) < 1. Consider replacing this
menu option with the option (p + 1 − ℓ(p), 1). Observe that the buyer’s risk-averse utility
under the two options is identical—relative to the original option, the buyer loses an additive
amount of 1 − ℓ(p) in his first-stage utility but gains the same additive amount of 1 − ℓ(p)
in his second-stage utility in the new menu option. On the other hand, the seller’s revenue
under the two options is also identical—the seller’s first-stage revenue is higher by an additive
1 − ℓ(p) amount under the new option, but his second-stage revenue is lower by the same
additive 1− ℓ(p) amount. Therefore, without loss of generality, we may replace (p, ℓ(p)) with
the new option (p+ 1− ℓ(p), 1) without affecting the buyer’s utility or the seller’s revenue.
2. We show below that the effective menu Mε must be of the form [1, p]. Then, the revenue
from such an effective menu is 1 + Ev∼F1 [min(v, p)] because the buyer purchases the op-
tion with price min(v, p) in the first stage, and the mechanism gets a fixed revenue of 1
in the second stage. In order to obtain a c-approximation, this quantity must be at least
1
cEv∼F1 [min(v, Uε(0))], implying, by the definition of pε that p ≥ pε.
• First, for ε < ε′, Mε′ ⊆ Mε. For any price p in Mε′ , and any p
′ < p < 1/ε, it must be
the case that the effective price for p′ is at least as large:
p′ − Uε′(ℓ(p
′)) ≥ p− Uε′(ℓ(p)).
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However, as Uε(ℓ(p)) =
∫ 1/ε
ℓ(p)
1−F2(v2)−ε
1−ε dv2, then
Uε(ℓ(p))− Uε(ℓ(p
′)) =
∫ ℓ(p′)
ℓ(p)
1− F2(v2)− ε
1− ε
dv2
≥
∫ ℓ(p′)
ℓ(p)
1− F2(v2)− ε
′
1− ε′
dv2
= Uε′(ℓ(p))− Uε′(ℓ(p
′))
≥ p− p′
Hence the effective price of p−Uε(ℓ(p)) is preferable to any smaller first-stage price under
ε; a buyer with value p would prefer this menu option to all others.
• Second, we claim that without loss of generality effective menus are contiguous; adding
missing points only improves revenue at all risk profiles in Y. Suppose not, and consider
two first-stage prices in the effective menu, p1 and p2 > p1, where no intermediate
first-stage price is in the effective menu. Then p1 − U(ℓ(p1)) ≥ p2 − U(ℓ(p2)). For
every α ∈ (0, 1), we can add a menu option (p′, ℓ(p′)) with first-stage price p′ = αp1 +
(1 − α)p2. To have a non-increasing effective price, we note that it is possible to set
ℓ(p′) = U−1(αU(ℓ(p1)) + (1 − α)U(ℓ(p2)) since ℓ(p1) > ℓ(p2) and U(ℓ(p1)) < U(ℓ(p2)).
Then a buyer with value v ∈ (p1, p2) will pay v instead of p1, earning only more revenue
for the seller.
• Finally, it is without loss of generality to assume that the effective menu is of the form
[1, p]. From the first two observations we know that the menu is of the form [l, h], earning
revenue in the first stage equal to Ev∼F1
[
min(v, h) · 1[v>l]
]
. Suppose that h − l = p.
Because the revenue is the area above the c.d.f from l to h, a window of width p, this is
strictly increased by shifting the window to the left, at [1, p].
3. This follows by recalling that for any p, Ev∼F1 [min(v, p)] = 1 + ln p, and then solving for pε.
4. For any p < pε, because pε is in the effective menu, then for all p < pε,
pε − Uε(ℓ(pε)) ≤ p− Uε(ℓ(p)).
Therefore
lim
p→pε
Uε(ℓ(pε))− Uε(ℓ(p))
pε − p
≥ 1.
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Proof of Lemma 6. For any ε ≥ e−n,
Uε(0) = 1 +
∫ en
1
yǫ(1/v)dv
= 1 +
∫ 1/ε
1
[
1
v
(1 + ε)− ε
]
dv +
∫ en
1/ε
1
v2
dv
= 1 + (1 + ε) ln 1/ε− ε(1/ε − 1) + ε− e−n
= 2ε− e−n + (1 + ε) ln 1/ε.
Since ε ≥ e−n, this is at least ln 1/ε. If ε < e−n, a similar argument shows Uε(0) ≥ n.
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